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Abstract: The recent literature on the effects of the Central Guarantee Fund (CGF) 
shows a positive but moderate effect of CGF on subsidized firms and involved regional 
economies. Nevertheless, the results neglect the presence of spatial relations across firms 
and regions. The spillovers can be positive, on the demand side, or negative, tightening 
factor markets. In this paper we deal with spatial effect of CGF, considering spillovers 
across NUTS-3 areas in Italy. The impact is decomposed into direct effects on the NUTS-
3 areas where the guarantees are required, and indirect effects from the neighboring 
areas. We use different models combining a «long» DID approach and a spatial Durbin 
model. The results suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant, albeit 
modest, correlation between the use of CGF and the growth of provincial economies, 
controlling for sectoral differences, dimensional characteristics and several interactions. 
The presence of spatial spillovers marginally increases the positive effect of the CGF.
Keywords: guarantee fund, impact evaluation, spatial econometrics.
JEL classification: G28, R11, H81.
1. Background and motivations
Public guarantee schemes are well-known instruments aimed at facilitating 
access by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) to external finance. 
Many governments provide credit guarantees to SMEs for start-up and ex-
pansion. In the course of the global financial crisis, several countries have 
implemented public credit guarantee schemes as countercyclical programmes, 
inducing a significant increase in their extent and use (Gozzi, Schmukler, 
2016).
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However, while these programmes have been implemented for years, their 
evaluation has been rare. Recently, several contributions have proposed an 
assessment of the performance of credit lending programs, but the empiri-
cal evidence has provided mixed, if not contradictory, results. In Italy, few 
papers evaluate the impact at firm level. Both Zecchini and Ventura (2009) 
and Mariani et al. (2013) show a positive impact of public guarantees schemes 
on credit availability. By contrast, D’Ignazio and Menon (2013) evaluate a 
local Italian guarantee scheme and provide evidence that the program had 
no significant impact on the total volume of firms’ bank debt. Also, de Blasio 
et al. (2017) assess the impact of the Central Guarantee Fund on subsidized 
firms. They show that the scheme does not affect the interest rate charged 
by banks, while it positively affects the likelihood that a firm is unable to 
repay its loans. Moreover, no effect is found on firms’ investments. Boschi 
et al. (2014) estimate the effect of partial credit guarantees on firms’ financ-
ing, showing the importance of heterogeneity in guarantee intensities that 
influence additionality effect. An evaluation at territorial level is presented 
only in De Castris and Pellegrini (2016).
In other countries, the evaluation of credit guarantees schemes shows 
weak evidence of the positive impact of the public guarantee scheme on 
credit and firms performances. Hancock et al. (2007) estimate the impact 
of credit guarantees at firm level in USA, showing positive effects on firms’ 
output and employment. Riding et al. (2007) find that in Canada the scheme 
had a positive impact on loans financed by banks. Lelarge et al. (2010) evalu-
ate a French scheme, and they find a positive effect on credits availability, 
interest rates and firms’ output. Kang and Heshmati (2008) evaluate Korean 
schemes and provide weak evidence in favor of credit guarantees with respect 
to firms’ sales, productivity and employment. Uesugi et al. (2010) show that 
in Japan firms use loans only to cover operating losses.
All these papers evaluate the performance of the subsidized firms, com-
paring them to a credible counterfactual scenario. However, policy makers 
are concerned with the overall effects of the policy instruments on the re-
gional economy: the net effects can be different from the cumulated effects 
on treated firms in the presence of (negative or positive) spillovers or any 
kind of economic interference.
In the international literature, only Craig et al. (2007) have assessed 
the effectiveness of guaranteed loans in regional markets. Using data on 
Metropolitan Statistical Areas in the USA, they show a positive relation 
between growth of per capita income in the areas and amount of guaran-
teed loans. De Castris and Pellegrini (2016) estimate the overall effect of 
national CGF at provincial level, correlating the use of the CGF with the 
growth of employment and firms. However, these papers do not consider 
that the effect of the CGF may be direct on the NUTS3 areas where the 
guarantees are required, and indirect in the neighboring areas. The pres-
ence of spatial relations among firms in different regions affect the sign 
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and the size of spillovers, which can be positive, on the demand side, or 
negative, tightening factor markets.
The aim of our paper is to evaluate the impact of the Central Guarantee 
Fund (Law 662/96 Art. 2 Comma 100 Lett. A) on the economic growth of 
the Italian provinces. The Central Guarantee Fund (henceforth CGF) is a 
public guarantee scheme addressed to micro, small and medium-sized enter-
prises to support access to bank credit, both for investments and cash. Our 
empirical evaluation strategy is based on a «long» DID estimator at NUTS-3 
level for Italy, taking account of endogeneity in the model and the presence 
of spatial relations among firms and regions. To our knowledge, our paper 
is the first to assess the overall effect of an Italian public guarantee scheme 
on local growth by considering special interferences.
From an economic point of view, there are many reasons justifying the 
existence of a public guarantee scheme (De Castris, Pellegrini 2016; Gozzi, 
Schmukler, 2016). However, assessment of the overall impact of the instrument 
on the regional economy should consider the presence of spillovers within 
the territorial unit or among the closest territorial units. Firms subsidized 
by government guarantees usually generate a crowding-out effect versus the 
closest unsubsidized enterprises in terms of credit, investment, input or out-
put. In other words, government guarantees can generate negative spillover 
effects in the local area and also in the closest regions. In this case, the net 
effect of the policy on the region could be uncertain: indeed, the positive 
effects may outweigh the negative spillovers generated by the intervention 
on the local economy. Therefore, the presence of a positive effect is basically 
an empirical issue that has to be measured using the instrument of causal 
models and spatial analysis.
The adopted model considers the presence of spillovers. In general, spatial 
spillovers are generated by economic relations linking spatially neighbouring 
firms. However, spillovers may be related to economic relationships among 
different sectors, sizes and territories. The multiplicity of these links entails 
the need to reduce their dimensionality so that they can be efficiently esti-
mated and overfitting of the model be avoided. We adopted the following 
restrictions, which are linked to the theoretical analysis of the spillover 
effects: no spillovers between different sectors; no spatial spillovers of an 
order higher than the first one. Therefore, the chosen approach considers 
three categories of spillovers: (size) spillovers between firms of different 
sizes in the same sector and region; (spatial) spillovers between firms of 
the same size and sector in adjacent regions; (size and spatial) spillovers 
between firms of the same sector but of different sizes in adjacent regions. 
This method captures a rich range of interactions among firms and regions, 
using a feasible econometric approach.
The econometric analysis shows that there is a positive and statistically 
significant, albeit modest, correlation between the use of the Fund and the 
growth of the provincial economy. The presence of spatial spillovers margin-
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ally increases the positive effect of the CGF. Although the empirical evidence 
that this is a causal relationship remains very difficult and complex, the 
estimation strategy, in some aspects innovative with respect to the literature, 
is robust to different specifications of the model.
The paper is constructed as follows. The next section presents the public 
instrument. The evaluation strategy and the proposed econometric model 
are presented in section 3, the source of the data in section 4, the proposed 
econometric model that includes the presence of spatial spillover in section 
5. Finally, in section 6, we analyse the results of various estimates, reporting 
also a robustness analysis. The last chapter states some conclusions on the 
overall effects of the instrument, considering the direct and indirect impact 
on the regional growth.
2. The programme
The CGF is a public instrument devoted to help small and medium-sized 
enterprises, which have several difficulties in financing themselves on the 
credit market, to receive the credit that they need. In Italy, since the begin-
ning of the international crisis, a large number of SMEs have felt the credit 
crunch and experienced a reduction of credit flows and high interest rates.
The CGF offers guarantees only to SME operating in the manufactur-
ing, construction and services sectors, excluding agriculture, automobiles 
and finance. Enterprises can obtain up to 80% of the value of a bank loan, 
not exceeding the maximum amount of guarantees for each one, equal to 
1,5 million euros. The CGF issues both short-term and long-term loans for 
the final use.
The admission procedure is as follows: a SME that needs to borrow may 
ask the bank to apply for a public guarantee or, alternatively, a bank may 
advise the firm to apply for the guarantee; the eligibility of the firm for the 
scheme is evaluated by a scoring system provided by the CFG that consid-
ers mainly financial stability, short-term financial burden and cash-flow; on 
the basis of the score, the firms that are eligible have to undergo a further 
assessment, which concludes with the final approval or rejection.
The CGF has been operating since 2000. In a period of approximately 
13 years (until 31 December 2013) the CGF granted 299,115 guarantees to 
173,833 SMEs: 47,34 euros billion of loans to SMEs eligible for the public 
guarantee. The scheme has been recently re-financed, also with the repro-
gramming of the Structural Funds, and is now the measure most financed 
by Italian regional and industrial policies. 
The average size of enterprises guaranteed by the CGF is small, as to be 
expected: 66% are micro enterprises, 26% are small, the remaining 8% are 
medium-sized enterprises. Usually firms access the CGF several times. On 
average each company which had access to CGF received 1.7 guarantees and 
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an average amount of loans guaranteed by CGF of about 272,331 euros. For 
micro enterprises this figure is 109,000 euros, for small ones it is around 
432,000 euros, for medium-sized companies around 1,073,000 euros. Most 
guarantees have been granted on loans directed to finance firms’ current 
operations, which also includes working capital and stocks (more than 81%).
3. The identification strategy
The regional net effect of the policy’s instrument can be evaluated by 
comparing the dynamics of regional development indicators (such as the 
employment growth rate, or value added growth rate, or firms’ growth rate) 
for a given spatial dimension to the level of the policy. The analysis evalu-
ates the presence of a correlation, positive or negative, between the use of 
the guarantee funds and the economic growth. The effects identified, if any, 
would be the overall effects, including spillovers. This approach also has an 
interesting advantage: it observes not only the presence or absence of the 
policy, but also its intensity1.
A potentially serious problem in evaluating the effects of such policies 
is the presence of spillover effects among firms and areas. In fact, if the 
untreated firms that form the control group are affected by spillovers from 
treated firms, the estimated treatment effect is biased even in the case of 
a random experiment. Moreover, in the presence of negative spillovers the 
policy attractiveness of the programme may change. For example, evidence 
that Public Guarantee Schemes lead to job growth may be regarded quite 
differently depending on whether the treated firms have created new jobs, 
or workers have moved from one firm to another to take advantage of better 
economic conditions. Of course, relocation among firms does not necessarily 
imply that a programme has not succeeded. However, policymakers should 
evaluate information on whether job creation in target firms comes at the 
expense of other firms, or via net job creation. The spillover can be also 
positive, for example by increasing activity and growth in some areas.
However, is not easy to obtain direct estimates net of spillovers (see De 
Castris, Pellegrini, 2012). Cerqua and Pellegrini (2017) presented an econo-
metric approach where the identification of spillover is based on specific 
assumptions concerning the spatial and economic dimension of the links 
(or interference) among firms. In this paper we adopt another approach, 
one often used in the literature based on the territorial aggregation: firstly, 
1 The model can be interpreted as a causal model based on a DID (considering long differences) 
estimator using a continuous intensity variable. There are several examples in the literature, for 
instance Bondonio and Greenbaum (2006). However, the absence of pre-treatment data prevents us 
from testing the «parallel trends» hypothesis. Therefore, caution in interpreting the results is neces-
sary, even if the endogeneity problem is tackled using an IV approach.
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data are aggregated at the area level in order to capture both direct effects 
and spillovers among firms within areas. (Bondonio, 2002; Criscuolo et al., 
2016). Area-level outcome is regressed on policy intensity conditioned on 
covariates, capturing the overall effect of the policy; secondly, the spillovers 
among neighboring areas are captured by a Durbin spatial model, using first 
order spatial lag of the dependent variable and the exogenous variables in 
the same sector. This approach makes it possible to decompose the impact 
of CGF into different components: the direct effect, i.e. the effect on the 
area where the guaranteed firms are located, and the indirect effect linked 
to the positive or negative spatial spillovers coming from the neighbouring 
areas. The assumed restrictions are that only first-level spatial lags and only 
within-sector spillovers are not negligible.
Using this approach, the identification of the effects depends on the 
importance of the policy program with respect to confounding factors. In 
several regional programs the economic weight of the group of subsidized 
firms is negligible compared to the regional economy, so that the impact of 
the policy becomes virtually indistinguishable from the changes produced by 
different prominent confounding factors. Bondonio (2002) suggests that the 
geographic unit on which to measure the results should represent an economic 
dimension as close as possible to the financial measure of business activity 
stimulated by the policies. Therefore, local policies require a local geographic 
dimension for the analysis, whereas national politics require the national one.
To overcome these difficulties, we adopted a composite evaluation 
strategy. We chose the province administrative unit (NUT3 level) as the 
relevant territorial dimension. Moreover, the «provincial» dimension is the 
minimum unit for which robust statistical information is available but also 
includes relevant territorial effects. Sectoral and dimensional heterogeneity 
is the major confounding factor, and the analysis was conditioned on it. The 
policy dimension can be captured by different variables. We considered 
various policy variables and outcomes in order to increase the robustness 
of the econometric analysis. 
The presence of endogeneity of the policy variable is reduced by the 
adoption of different econometric strategies based on the IV approach. One 
strategy is based on the Bartik instrument, which uses the national shock 
re-weighted at the provincial level with the sectorial shares. The variable is 
often used as an instrument in the literature, for instance in Moretti (2010). 
The use of the Bartik instrument in a context very similar to that of our pa-
per is in Greenstone, Mas and Nguyen (2017). Using the Bartik instrument 
is equivalent to using local industry shares as instruments: see for instance 
Goldsmith-Pinkham, Sorkin and Swift (2018). This paper argues that the 
Bartik design is based on randomness of sectoral shares across locations. In 
our example, the CGF affects only a tiny share of the firms in the provinces, 
so that the impact on the sector share is very low. A suggested test is to 
regress the worker growth rate multiplied by the sector shares to provincial 
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dummies. Considering all the provinces together, the p-value of the F test 
of the regression is (marginally) higher than the 5% threshold. However, if 
we split the sample regression considering only the Northern provinces and 
only the Southern provinces, in both cases the p-value is higher than 20% 
and we cannot reject the null hypothesis of randomness of sectoral shares 
across provinces. The other strategy for the IV approach uses growth in not 
eligible sectors as instrument.
The spatial spillovers were captured by a Durbin spatial model that 
included the spatially lagged value of the dependent variable. Moreover, us-
ing the assumption that the spillovers, within and outside the province, are 
generated in the same production sector, we inserted into the model also the 
value of the dependent variable for firms of different sizes but in the same 
sector. Considering spatial spillovers, the model included also the spatially 
lagged value of this variable. The econometric models that we used in the 
analysis are fully described in section 5.
4. Data
The empirical analysis was based on a data set constructed in order to 
match three different sources of data: information on companies that had 
used the Guarantee Fund; demographic information on firms (from the Na-
tional Statistical Institute archive on enterprises, which provides information 
on sector, size and geographical location of firms); and the bank loans by 
provinces made available by the Bank of Italy. The purpose of the analysis 
was to identify the effects of the CGF on territorial growth. We considered 
the administrative grid of 110 Italian provinces in 2007, which corresponds 
to the NUTS3 spatial level in Italy, a sharp territorial disaggregation. 
The sectoral composition that we adopted considered four macro-sectors 
(industry and energy, construction, trade and hotels, other services) and 
it excluded the sectors not eligible for Fund support such as agricultural, 
transport, metallurgy, fibers, transport, and some of smaller size. For the 
firm’s size, we classify the firms into two groups: firms with fewer than 20 
employees, and firms with between 20 and 250 employees, where 250 is the 
upper limit admitted by the CGF. The size of the classes was harmonized 
with the credit statistics classification adopted by the Bank of Italy in order 
to match with the CGF data set.
The data spanned the period from 2008 to 2011. We used a model of 
long differencing where output variables were expressed in terms of growth 
rates from 2008 to 2011. Our dataset consisted of 880 observations that 
corresponded to 110 units, the provinces, for 4 sectors, for 2 firm’s sizes. 
Local growth was represented in the model by employment growth rate. 
The output variables chosen were the employment growth rate by province, 
sector and size class from 2008 to 2011.
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The policy intervention was captured by three different variables: the 
maximum value of the guarantees that can be granted; the level of funding 
descendants from the collateral; the firms that had benefited from these 
guarantees. Since the provinces have different sizes, it was necessary to 
standardize the variables: the first two were normalized with the number of 
employees by sector, size and province, the last with the number of firms. 
For all three variables we considered the cumulative sum for the years 
2009-2010-2011, divided by the cumulative sum of employees in the same 
period, in order to obtain an estimate of the average of the intervention of 
the Fund in the period considered. The treatment’s variable was continuous 
because it represented the treatment intensity. This enabled us to estimate 
the elasticity of growth rate by the intensity of the aid in the province.
Table 1 presents the average values of the policy variables and output 
variable. These values refer to the 880 observations, classified across three 
variables, province, size and sector. As shown in the table, in the sample 
there are on average about 270,000 guarantees per employee correspond-
ing to slightly less than double in terms of funding. Moreover, firms are 
guaranteed by the Fund on average for about 3% of the total (taking into 
account the industry and the allowable size). The employees’ growth rate 
in the period is negative, amounting to about 11% in terms of employees, 
-7% in terms of firms. 
We considered different covariates to describe the structural dimension 
of provinces. Province, sectoral and size effects were controlled by dummy 
variables and interactions. We also added a variable on the share of direct 
guarantees on the total, to model the operational procedure of the fund.
A key aspect of the analysis concerned the endogeneity of the policy vari-
ables: we could not exclude reverse causality, i.e. that in a growing region 
the demand for guarantees is higher because a higher number of firms ask 
for credit. To take this bias into account, at least partially, we used two joint 
strategies, based on IV, using instruments not linked to regional shocks due 
to the policy variables. One approach uses employees’ growth at national 
level, by sector and size as instrument (the Bartik instrument). The variable 
is re-weighted at the provincial level with the sectoral share of workers (in 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of policy variables and dependent variable
Policy variables Mean Minimum Maximum
Guarantees by employee (thousands euros) 286 0 2342
Funding by employee (thousands euros) 494 0 4164
Share of guaranteed firms (%) 2.98 0 21.4
Dependent variable
Employment growth rate (%) -11.25 -68.72 53.51
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2008). In this way one obtains an indicator of demand related to exogenous 
shock nationwide that can take account of the different composition of the 
economy at the provincial level. This indicator was used not only as exog-
enous variable but also to decompose the provincial growth (in terms of size 
and industry) into the national component and the idiosyncratic component.
The other approach uses the employees’ growth in sectors not eligible for 
guarantee by the CGF as instrument. The analysis considered the sectors of 
transport, equipment manufacture, metallurgy, financial services, transpor-
tation services, while the excluded sectors were agriculture and the public 
sector. This variable could help eliminate shock at provincial level that also 
affected the policy variables.
The spatial analysis was carried out using a spatial matrix W describ-
ing the presence of contiguity between provinces. We assumed that two 
provinces are contiguous if they are adjacent on at least one edge. It is a 
usual row-standardized spatial matrix, where the row sum is equal to one 
(Elhorst, 2014).
5. The evaluation model
The econometric basis for the evaluation of territorial effects was a Diff-
in-Diffs model designed to capture «long» differences (differencing across 
several years). However, the policy variable was continuous, so that the 
model compared and identified the effects of the CGF for different levels of 
«treatment», that is, for the different weights of interventions in the province.
The basic model was constructed as follows:
DYijr = a + b1Pijr + b2Xijr + b3Di + b4Dj + b5Dr + b6Intij + fijr [1]
where each variable is defined by province (r), sector (j) and size (i):
DYijr is the outcome growth rate variable;
Pijr is the policy variable;
Dr is the provincial dummy;
Dj is the sector dummy;
Di is the firm size dummy;
Intij = Di * Dj is the interaction variable between sector and size;
fijr = error variable;
Xijr = other covariates: share of direct guarantees, provincial average interest 
rate of CGF operations.
The endogeneity of the policy variable requires use of an approach differ-
ent from OLS. We adopted a 2SLS approach, using as exogenous variables 
the national re-weighted growth rate of employees (Bartik instrument) and 
provincial sectoral growth rate of employees for sectors not admissible in 
the Fund as instruments.
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The outcome variable was the employment growth rate in the period 
2008-2011. The models were estimated considering three different policy 
variables (maximum guarantees by employee, maximum funding by em-
ployee, share of guaranteed firms, all normalized, in the same period). We 
used both IV and OLS methods, for robustness analysis. The introduction 
of the spatial lag of the dependent variable changes the equation in a SAR 
model, estimated with a GMM approach2, in order to have a statistically 
correct estimation of territorial effects of the CGF.
The hypothesis that we used in the spatial version of the model was that 
such spillovers occur only within the same sector. Therefore, we augmented 
the model by using spillovers between different sizes and between neighbor-
ing provinces but in the same sector. 
Hence the model was augmented as follows:
 DYijr = a + b1Pijr + b2Xijr + b3Di + b4Dj + b5Dr + b6Intij + [2]
	 b7WDYijr + b8WDY-ijr + b9DY-ijr + fijr
where:
W is the contiguity row-standardized spatial weights matrix;
W*DYijr is the generic element of spatial lag of DY (spatial spillover). Each 
element represents the outcome growth rate in the neighboring province (r), 
the same sector (j) and the same size (i);
DY-ijr is the generic element of the outcome growth rate in the same province 
and sector but of different size (-i) (size spillover);
W*DY-ijr is the generic element of the outcome growth rate in the neighboring 
province, the same sector but of different size (-i) (size and spatial spillover).
In this model, b1 is the direct effects due to subsidies. The total impact 
bT is estimated considering also the policy spillover (I – b7W)
-1b1P, where the 
additional effect (bT – b1)
 is given by spillover from neighbouring areas due 
to the indirect impact of the subsidy on them3.
Note that LeSage and Pace (2009) propose reporting two different sum-
mary indicators: for the direct effect, the average of the diagonal elements 
of the matrix on the right-hand side of (2), and for the indirect effect, the 
2 We used the Spivreg routine in Stata, restricting rho to 0.
3 However, the total impact bT considers the impact on firms within the same sector and size, that 
is, the impact of the policy only on a specific kind of firm. If one wants to consider also the impact 
of the policy on firms in the same sector but different size one should add a different variable W*P-ijr, 
i.e. a policy variable in the neighbouring province, the same sector but different size. Moreover, one 
should add also the impact from spillovers coming from different areas. Therefore, one should add 
in the model W*P-rij, that is, a policy variable that affects the neighbouring province, the same sector 
and the same size. However, in the enriched model it is very difficult to identify the overall effects of 
the policy, because it brings together policies adopted in different areas for firms of different sizes. 
For this reason, in this paper we present results of model (2), considering only the direct or indirect 
effects by area, sector and size.
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average of either the row sums or the column sums of the off-diagonal ele-
ments of that matrix.
Generally, the indirect effect is interpreted as the impact of changing a 
particular element of an exogenous variable on the dependent variable of all 
other units, which corresponds to the average column effect (Elhorst, 2014). 
This indicator is also presented in the description of our results.
6. Results
The results are summarized in Tables 2-3, which show the coefficients, 
their significance and the explanatory power of the various models. In Table 
2 the results of the OLS model (without spillover effects) for employment 
growth are presented. In a previous model, the variable «average interest 
rate» was considered, but it was not statistically significant and therefore 
excluded in the chosen specification.
Bondonio’s criticism (2002) concerning the irrelevance of territorial inter-
vention can be applied to CGF action. However, in our specification the policy 
variables have a reasonable overall statistical significance and the expected 
sign. Considering that the subsidized loans from the CGF cover on average 
only 3% of total loans by area, and subsidized firms are on average only 0.5% 
of the total firms in the area, the relevance of the results can be appreciated.
The significant effects are mainly related to the funding per employee 
indicator, which is definitely more correlated to growth than the other policy 
variables. Also the effect of the guarantees per employee is slightly significant.
Considering the model with spatial spillovers and estimated by IV (Table 
3), impacts are higher and often statistically more significant that in OLS mod-
els. The presence of spatial spillover is clear and highly statistically significant 
in all the three models. Considering endogeneity, the impacts of the CGF is 
stronger: a possible explanation is that the results are mainly related to the long 
period of negative growth that depressed the use of the instrument. Indeed, 
the period considered in the paper was characterized by the beginning of a 
severe national recession. The growth rates are usually negative. Therefore, 
we expected that the OLS would be downward biased. However, the differ-
ences are large, and this result requires further analysis using a longer period.
Considering the results and the average value of the variables involved, 
we estimate that a 10% increase per employee of collateral would result in 
an increase of approximately 1% of the growth rate of employees in the 
province. Therefore, the impact is positive, significant, but overall modest.
However, the direct and indirect effects’ estimates by the procedure pro-
posed by LeSage and Pace (2009) show that the indirect effects are positive 
but low, around 5% of the direct effect (Table 4). This was not unexpected, 
since the territorial unit that we used was quite large and comprised several 
labor markets.
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Table 2: Model with policy effects, OLS estimates, no spatial spillovers. Dependent variable: provincial 
employment growth rate
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Funding by employee 33.962***
(11.610)
Guarantees by employee 35.565*
(18.693)
Share of guaranteed firms 0.229
(0.190)
Firm size (dummy) 0.042** 0.048*** 0.044**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.020)
Direct guarantee (dummy) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Construction (dummy) -0.095*** -0.099*** -0.103***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Trade and hotel (dummy) 0.072*** 0.069*** 0.066***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Other services (dummy) 0.038** 0.033** 0.028*
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Size * construction (dummy) -0.053** -0.050** -0.044*
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Size * trade and hotel (dummy) -0.051** -0.050** -0.044*
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023)
Size * other services (dummy) -0.058** -0.061*** -0.060**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Provincial dummies yes yes yes
Constant -0.200*** -0.195*** -0.194***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049)
Observations 880 880 880
R-squared 0.374 0.369 0.368
Legend: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1.
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Table 3: Model with policy effects, GS2SLS estimates, with spatial spillovers. Dependent variable: provin-
cial employees’ growth. Instruments: National re-weighted employment growth rate (Bartik instrument); 
Spatial lag of the policy variable
Variables (1) (2) (3)
Constant -0.056 -0.034 -0.044
(0.045) (0.043) (0.045)
Lambda (b7) (spatial spillover) 0.065*** 0.066*** 0.064***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Funding by employee (thousands euros) 33.997**
(13.979)
Guarantees by employee (thousands euros) 37.219*
(21.958)
Share of guaranteed firms (%) 0.371*
(0.225)
Direct guarantee share -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Size spillover -0.141*** -0.140*** -0.138***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034)
Size and spatial spillover 0.324*** 0.327*** 0.328***
(0.072) (0.072) (0.072)
Firm size (dummy) -0.020 -0.025 -0.014
(0.018) (0.018) (0.021)
Construction (dummy) -0.007 -0.008 -0.013
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Trade and hotel (dummy) 0.023 0.019 0.018
(0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Other services (dummy) 0.021 0.016 0.013
(0.016) (0.016) (0.015)
Size * construction (dummy) -0.057*** -0.054** -0.048**
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Size * trade and hotel (dummy) -0.040* -0.039* -0.033
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Size * other services (dummy) -0.030 -0.032 -0.028
(0.023) (0.023) (0.024)
Provincial dummies yes yes yes
Observations 880 880 880
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7. Concluding remarks 
Policy makers are interested in evaluating the net impact of the instru-
ments on a specific area. Even in the case of the CGF for SMEs, where the 
link between instrument and territorial dynamics appears weaker, we have 
shown the existence of positive net effects at the local level of the increase 
in loans related to the CGF operations. The existence of such effects is not 
obvious: it is often discussed whether the operation of the CGF was in fact 
likely to transfer at least part of the advantage enjoyed by banks to firms. 
This would justify the high public contributions to the CGF.
The analysis was conducted at the provincial level, an adequate territo-
rial dimension for the effects of the Fund. When using this grid, the impact 
of the CGF covered on average only 3% of companies and 0.5% of loans. 
This, however, had still created leverage effects in the territory, apparently 
by stimulating productive activity and investment and thus growth at lo-
cal level. The results obtained, using a variety of analyses and estimators, 
generally indicate a positive, statistically significant, although modest, effect 
of the CGF. On average, an increase of 10% of the guarantees would be 
reflected in an average 1% increase in the employment growth rate. A more 
than 10% increase of the funding would have a double effect, a 2% growth 
rate of employees.
These results depend on the ability of models to isolate the endogenous 
component that characterizes the instrument with respect to the territorial 
growth. Several attempts have been made in this direction in our paper, 
although caution in interpreting the results is still necessary, given the need 
for further study in this regard, especially in order to improve the causal 
interpretation of the model.
To conclude, the CGF appears to be a tool useful not only to overcome 
the imperfections in the credit market but also to provide enterprises with 
the financial resources necessary to develop the local economy. However, 
on its own it is not enough to stimulate stable local growth. It must be ac-
companied by measures designed to support long-lasting local development, 
like incentives for innovation and human capital development.
Table 4: Marginal effects
Treatment variable Direct effects Indirect effects
Funding per employee 40.65 2.54
Guarantees per employee 48.64 4.68
Share of guaranteed firms 0.68 0.13
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